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NEGLIGENCE VS. SCIENTER: THE PROPER
STANDARD OF LIABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE
ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS REGULATING TENDER
OFFERS AND PROXY SOLICITATIONS UNDER THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Tender offers' and proxy solicitations2 traditionally have been the most
popular methods for acquiring corporate control.3 Although both the tender
offer and the proxy battle are alternative means for achieving an identical
1. See Korval, Defining Tender Offers: Resolving a Decade of Dilemma, 13 SEC. L. REv.
549, 549 (1981). A tender offer is an invitation to shareholders of a target corporation to sell
all or part of their shares at a substantial premium over the current market price. Id. The SEC
and Congress, however, have declined to define the term "tender offer" for purposes of the
Williams Act. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596 (5th Cir.) (neither SEC
nor Congress defines "tender offer"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Note, Preliminary In-
junctive Relief and Tender Offers: An Analysis Under The Williams Act, 49 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 563, 563 n.2 (1981) (no congressional or SEC definition of "tender offer") [hereinafter
cited as Injunctive Reliei]; infra note 11 (discussing Williams Act). Nonetheless, the SEC has
issued a proposed rule that would define the term "tender offer" under the Williams Act. SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-16385, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,374, at 82,600 (Nov. 29, 1979). The SEC proposal consists of two alternative defini-
tions of a tender offer. Id. at 82,603. The first SEC definition is that a tender offer is an offer
to purchase or solicitation to sell a single class of securities during any 45 day period, directed
at more than 10 shareholders with an intent to acquire more than 5% of the class of securities.
Id. Under the second SEC proposed tender offer definition, one or more offers to purchase or
solicitations to sell securities of a single class would constitute a tender offer if the transaction
meets three conditions. Id. at 82,604. First, the tender offeror must disseminate widely the offers
to purchase and solicitations to sell. Id. at 82,604-05. Second, the tender offeror's price for the
desired securities must represent a premium of the greater of 5% over the current market price
or $2 above the current market price. Id. at 82,605. Finally, the price offered by the tender of-
feror may not be negotiated. Id. The primary purpose of a tender offer is to obtain control
of a large corporation and replace the target corporation's incumbent management with a more
efficient acquiring management. See Note, An Implied Right of Action Under the Williams Act:
Tradition vs. Economic Reality, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 316, 323 (1982) (effect of tender offer is
to obtain more efficient management) [hereinafter cited as Implied Right].
2. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-l(f)(1) (1983). A proxy solicitation is a request for a proxy,
or a request to execute or not to execute a proxy, or the furnishing of a proxy or other com-
munication calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy. Id.
§ 240.14a-l(f)(l)(i)-(iii). A proxy is the agency relationship that occurs when a shareholder allows
a proxy holder to represent and vote for the shareholder at a corporate shareholder meeting.
See Note, Proxy Solicitation: The Need For Expanded Disclosure Requirements, 70 MARQ. L.
REV. 1100, 1101 (1977) (explaining agency relationship resulting from procurement of proxy).
3. See E. ARAHow & H. EIN -oRN, "TNDER OFFERS FOR CORPOATE CONTROL 64-65 (1973)
(popularity of tender offers increased during 1960's); PacnSNG LAW INsTrruTE, AcQuIsrrioNs
AN MERGERS 1982: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND TEcHNIQuEs 671-72 (1982) (proxy battle popular
in 1940's and 1950's while tender offer popular in 1960's and 1970's); Austin, Tender Offer Move-
ment Off in 1982, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 16, 1984, at 40 (use of tender offers increased from 2 in
1956 to 116 in 1981); Lewin, A Sudden New Wave of Corporate Proxy Vote Battles, L.A. Daily
J., July 8, 1982, at 7, col. I (popularity of proxy battles in 1940's and 1950's replaced by tender
offer in 1960's).
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result,4 different antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws regulate
tender offers and proxy statements.5 Section 14(a)6 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ('34 Act)7 makes it unlawful to solicit proxies in contravention
of the rules prescribed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).'
The SEC, pursuant to section 14(a), enacted rule 14a-99 prohibiting the use
of proxy solicitations containing false or misleading statements of fact, or
omissions of fact that are material to a shareholder's voting decision.'" In
contrast to rule 14a-9, section 14(e)"I of the Williams Act' 2 proscribes not only
4. See Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 430 (6th Cir.) ( both tender
offers and proxy solicitations used to obtain corporate control), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980);
Implied Right, supra note 1, at 323 (tender offers and proxies achieve same result).
5. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) (prohibiting use of false material statements, material
omissions, and fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices in connection with tender
offer) with 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1983) (prohibiting use of proxy solicitation containing false
or misleading statements of material fact, or omissions of material fact).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
7. Id. §§ 78a-78kk ('34 Act). In the '34 Act, Congress created the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to oversee and enforce federal securities rules and regulations. See id. § 78d(a)
(congressional creation of SEC).
8. See id. § 78n(a) (antifraud provision for proxy statements). The SEC is composed of
five commissioners appointed by the President. Id. § 78d(a). The SEC may appoint officers,
attorneys, examiners, and other experts to provide assistance in enforcing the securities laws.
Id. § 78d(b).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1983). SEC rule 14a-9 prohibits the solicitation of a proxy by
means of a proxy statement that is "false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or
which omits to state any material fact." Id.
10. Id.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). Section 14(e) of the Williams Act makes it unlawful for
any person to use an "untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact"
or to "engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices" in connection
with a tender offer. Id. Section 14(e) is a general antifraud provision that extends to any com-
munication made in connection with a tender offer. See id. The language of § 14(e) is similar
to the language of SEC rule 10b-5. Compare id. § 78n(e) (prohibiting use of false material statements,
material omissions, and fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices in connection
with tender offer) with 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1983) (prohibiting use of false material statements,
material omissions, and fraudulent devices, schemes, activities or practices in connection with
purchase or sale of securities). The SEC promulgated rule lob-5 under the rulemaking authority
granted in § 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 ('34 Act). See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying
text (discussing rule lOb-5).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982) (Williams Act). The popularity of the tender
offer increased in the mid-1960's because of a favorable business climate and the fact that, unlike
proxy statements, Congress had not yet given the SEC power to regulate tender offers. See Note,
Cash Tender Offers: A Proposed Definition, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 694, 697-99 (1979) (discussing
reasons for popularity of tender offers in mid-1960's) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Definition];
see also E. AR.Aow & H. EwHom, supra note 3, at 65-66 (listing numerous factors leading
to increase in popularity of tender offers). Because abuses accompanied the popularity of unregulated
tender offers, Congress amended the '34 Act by enacting the Williams Act to regulate the tender
offer takeover method. See Korval, supra note I, at 549-51 & n.4 (abuses accompanied popularity
of tender offers). The disclosure requirements of the Williams Act protect investors from corpor-
ate raiders who would compel shareholders to tender securities without allowing the shareholder
time to make a knowledgeable investment decision. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489
F.2d 579, 597 (5th Cir.) (shareholder may tender shares hastily without consideration of risks
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the use of false material statements and material omissions, but also fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices in connection with a tender offer.'3
Neither rule 14a-9 nor section 14(e), however, prescribes the proper standard
of liability to apply in assessing violations of either provision. 4 Consequently,
federal courts have struggled with determining the proper standard of liability
for federal proxy statement and tender offer antifraud violations."
Federal courts construing section 14(e) consistently have applied a scienter
standard of liability for tender offer antifraud violations similar to the scienter
standard courts have applied to SEC rule lOb-5 violations.' 6 Rule lOb-5, prom-
ulgated by the SEC pursuant to section 10(b) of the '34 Act, prohibits the
use of false material statements, material omissions, and fraudulent, decep-
tive or manipulative acts or practices in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities.' 7 Although neither section 10(b) nor rule lOb-5 prescribe the stan-
dard of liability courts are to apply, the Supreme Court has held that scienter
in absence of adequate disclosure), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974). A corporate raider would
seize control of a target company by purchasing the target company's stock and then sell the
target's assets without informing the target corporation of the stock acquisitions. See 113 CONG.
REc. 857-58 (statement by Mr. Kuchel) (disclosure requirements would prevent corporate raiders
from secretly obtaining control of target corporation). The primary purpose of the Williams Act
is to supply targeted shareholders with adequate information concerning the identity and inten-
tions of a tender offeror so that shareholders of a target corporation could make an informed
decision on whether to sell the stock of the target corporation. See Injunctive Relief, supra note
1, at 564. The drafters of the Williams Act avoided any anti-takeover sentiment because the drafters
realized that tender offers serve a useful purpose by providing a check on inefficient manage-
ment. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1967) (tender offers serve useful purpose
as check on inefficient incumbent management).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
14. See id. (§ 14(e) does not state standard of liability for tender offer antifraud viola-
tions); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1983) (rule 14a-9 does not state standard ofliability for proxy state-
ment antifraud violations).
15. Compare Fradkin v. Ernst, 571 F. Supp. 829, 843 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (negligence stan-
dard of liability is appropriate standard for misstatements in proxy) with Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir.) (scienter standard of liability is ap-
propriate standard for misstatements connected with tender offer), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
16. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir.) (scienter is
element of § 14(e) violation), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great
A & P Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 696 (2d Cir. 1973) (elements of relief in § 14(e) same as rule
lOb-5); SEC v. Texas Int'l Co., 498 F. Supp. 1231, 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (similarity in language
between § 14(e) and § 10(b) justifies applying rule lOb-5's scienter standard to § 14(e) actions);
Indiana Nat'l Bank v. Mobil Oil Corp., 457 F. Supp. 1028, 1032 (S.D. Ind. 1977) (scienter re-
quirement applicable to § 14(e) actions), aff'd, 578 F.2d 180 (1978); A & K R.R. Materials, Inc.
v. Green Bay & W. R.R., 437 F. Supp. 636, 642 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for truth sufficient standards of liability under § 14(e)); Applied Digital Data Sys. v.
Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1156-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (must act with scienter to violate
§ 14(e)); Billet v. Storage Technology Corp., 72 F.R.D. 583, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (§ 14(e) language
implies prohibition on fraudulent conduct); see supra note I 1 (explaining rule 1Ob-5); infra text
accompanying notes 17-19 (explaining rule lOb-5). In a confusing analysis, one court has held
that scienter need not be shown by the SEC under § 14(e). See SEC v. Wills, 472 F. Supp. 1250,
1268 (D.D.C. 1978) (SEC need not show scienter in § 14(e) action).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.I0b-5 (1983) (prohibiting use of manipulative or deceptive activity
associated with purchase or sale of security). Section 10(b) of the '34 Act prohibits the use of
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is the proper standard of liability for an implied private cause of action under
rule 10b-5.' 8 The Supreme Court has defined scienter as a mental state that
encompasses an actual intent to manipulate, defraud, or deceive. 19 The Supreme
Court adopted a scienter standard under rule lob-5 primarily because the
language of rule 10b-5 prohibits manipulative and deceptive activity.20 Although
section 14(e) applies to tender offers and rule 10b-5 applies to the purchase
or sale of securities, courts have applied the scienter standard of liability
developed under rule lob-5 to section 14(e) tender offer cases primarily because
of the similarity in language between rule 10b-5 and section 14(e). 21 For
example, in Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp. ,22 the Second
Circuit held that scienter is the appropriate standard of liability in a section
14(e) action.23 In Piper, Chris-Craft had announced a cash tender offer for
shares of Piper common stock. 24 Piper decided to oppose Chris-Craft's bid
to gain control of Piper by forwarding a letter to Piper stockholders stating
that the tender offer would not be in the best interests of Piper's shareholders.2"
manipulative or deceptive devices, in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, that violate
rules which the SEC enacts. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
18. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (scienter is proper standard
of liability for rule lob-5 violation); infra notes 88-99 and accompanying text (discussion of
Hochfelder); see also SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 77 (D.C. Cir.) (rule lob-5
private action requires that plaintiff prove defendant acted with scienter), cert. denied sub nom.
Kalmanovitz v SEC, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980); SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334 (5th Cir. 1978)
(SEC must prove defendant acted with scienter in rule lob-5 injunctive action); Nelson v. Ser-
wold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir.) (Hochfelder decision eliminated negligence as basis for liability
under rule lOb-5), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978).
19. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976) (definition of scienter
includes intent to defraud or deceive); infra notes 88-99 and accompanying text (discussion of
Hochfelder). The Supreme Court in Hoch/felder would not extend the standard of liability under
rule lob-5 actions to mere negligence. See 425 U.S. at 215.
20. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (rule lOb-5 language requires
imposition of scienter standard).
21. See SEC v. Texas Int'l Co., 498 F. Supp. 1231, 1252 (N.D. II1. 1980) (similarity in
language between § 14(e) and § 10(b) justifies applying rule lOb-5's scienter standard to § 14(e)
actions).
22. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (Supreme Court
reversed because tender offeror found to have no cause of action for damages under § 14(e)).
23. Id. at 364. The Second Circuit in Piper consolidated three separate appeals which in-
volved the same set of facts from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. Id. at 349. See generally, Bangor Punta Corp. v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 337 F.
Supp. 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1128
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), reversed,
480 F.2d 341 (1973).
24. 480 F.2d at 351. In Piper, Chris-Craft made eight separate purchases of Piper stock
before announcing the cash tender offer. Id. at 350. These eight purchases brought Chris-Craft's
stock holding in Piper to approximately 130 of all outstanding shares. Id. The tender offer
by Chris-Craft could have involved up to 300,000 shares at a price of $65 per share. Id. at 351.
In a press release, Chris-Craft stated that the tender offer was to be used to gain control of Piper. Id.
25. Id. In an attempt to increase the number of shares of Piper stock in the marketplace,
Piper agreed to sell 300,000 authorized but unissued shares to Grumman Aircraft Engineering
Corp. for $65 per share. Id. The transaction between Piper and Grumman failed when the New
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Moreover, Piper family members agreed to an exchange offer with Bangor
Punta Corporation that included specified Bangor Punta stock, warrants, and
debentures traded for the entire Piper family holdings of Piper stock.2 6 Both
Piper and Bangor Punta issued press releases describing the transaction.27 Chris-
Craft then filed suit for damages in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York alleging that the Piper letter to shareholders
and the press releases filed by Piper and Bangor Punta violated rule lOb-5
and section 14(e) since the letter and press releases contained material
misstatements.28 The district court denied Chris-Craft an award of damages
and dismissed Chris-Craft's complaint.
29
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that both Piper and Bangor Punta
violated section 14(e) of the Williams Act. 30 The Piper court noted that although
section 14(e) applies to tender offers while rule 10b-5 applies to the purchase
or sale of securities, section 14(e) and rule lOb-5 prohibit identical activities.3'
Because of structural similarities between section 14(e) of the Williams Act
and SEC rule lOb-5, the Second Circuit chose to apply the principles developed
under rule lOb-5 in determining whether Piper and Bangor Punta violated
section 14(e). 32 Specifically, the Second Circuit stated that a violation of sec-
tion 14(e) occurs when a defendant includes a material misstatement or omis-
sion within a tender offer that is sufficiently culpable to justify a holding for
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) refused to list the shares. Id. at 352. In addition to Piper's agree-
ment with Grumman, Piper agreed to exchange 320,000 authorized but unissued shares of Piper
stock for all of the oustanding shares of United States Concrete Pipe Company of Florida, and
to exchange 149,199 authorized but unissued shares of Piper stock for substantially all of the
outstanding shares of Southply, Inc. stock. Id. The NYSE refused to list the shares because Piper
did not obtain approval of Piper shareholders. Id. Nonetheless, Piper issued stock certificates
and the NYSE suspended trading in Piper stock until Piper cancelled the agreements. Id.
26. Id. at 353. In Piper, the exchange agreement between Bango Punta and Piper included
a promise by Bangor Punta to use its best effort to acquire more than 50% of the outstanding
shares of Piper stock. Id.
27. Id. The press releases in Piper, issued by Bangor Punta and Piper, included an offer
by Bangor Punta to Piper shareholders to sell a package of Bangor Punta securities that would
be valued at not less than $80 per share of Piper stock. Id. The SEC subsequently brought suit
against Bangor Punta under § 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act). See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c)
(1982) (prohibiting offer to sell securities before filing registration statement). Section 5 prohibits
an offer to sell securities before the registrant files a registration statement. Id.
28. 480 F.2d at 355.
29. Id. at 355-56. The district court in Piper held that although the press release violated
the securities laws, Chris-Craft failed to prove scienter and causation which are necessary for
a § 14(e) cause of action. Id. at 355.
30. Id. at 362.
31. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) (prohibiting manipulative or deceptive activity in
connection with tender offer); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983) (prohibiting manipulative or decep-
tive activity in purchase or sale of securities).
32. 480 F.2d at 362. The Piper court stated that the principle of materiality and the proper
standard of liability should be applied in assessing both rule lOb-5 and section 14(e) violations.
Id. The Second Circuit stated that materiality focuses on the weight of the misstated or omitted
information in a reasonable investor's decision to buy or sell. Id.
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the plaintiff. 3 The Piper court held that a defendant is sufficiently culpable
of a section 14(e) violation if the defendant either knowingly misstated or
omitted material facts in connection with a tender offer, or failed to ascertain
the correct facts when the facts were available or could have reasonably been
discovered."' The Second Circuit, however, implied that negligent conduct
would not permit recovery under section 14(e) because negligent conduct is
not sufficient to allow recovery under rule lOb-5."
Similar to section 14(e)'s purpose of ensuring informed shareholder voting
during tender offers, Congress intended section 14(a) to promote the free flow
of accurate, reliable information in proxy statements.3 6 Congress intended the
information requirements of section 14(a) to guarantee that shareholders had
sufficient information to make informed voting decisions concerning proxy
solicitations. 37 To ensure compliance with the congressional purpose of sec-
tion 14(a), the SEC enacted rule 14a-9 which imposes a duty on solicitors of
proxies to disclose any information that reasonably would tend to influence
the voting decision of a shareholder.3" Congress and the SEC sought to pre-
vent proxy solicitation abuses by focusing public attention on the proxy
statement.3
9
33. Id. The Second Circuit in Piper held that the materiality concept concerns whether
a reasonable investor would have considered the misstatement or omission important in deciding
whether to buy or sell a security. Id. at 362-63; see also TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (to establish materiality plaintiff must prove that reasonable investor
would have viewed omitted fact as significantly affecting investment decision); Holmes v. Bateson,
583 F.2d 542, 559 (Ist Cir. 1978) (omitted fact material if substantial likelihood exists that reasonable
shareholder would have considered fact important to investment decision); Harkavy v. Apparel
Indus., Inc., 571 F.2d 737, 741 (2d Cir. 1978) (omitted fact material if reasonable investor would
have considered fact significant); Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(test for materiality includes determination of whether misstated or omitted fact could have led
reasonable investor not to vote for proposal).
34. 480 F.2d at 364. The Piper court noted in its discussion of the concept of culpability
that the purpose of a scienter standard of liability is to properly limit liability to those defendants
whose conduct is deserving of punishment. Id. at 363.
35. Id. at 364.
36. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964). The Supreme Court in Borak
discussed the broad remedial purposes served by § 14(a). Id. at 431. The Court stated that
§ 14(a) prevents management from utilizing a misleading proxy statement to obtain authorization
for corporate action. Id. The Borak Court noted that § 14(a) arose out ,of the congressional
belief that every owner of an equity security should be guaranteed fair corporate suffrage. Id.
Additionally, the Court stated that Congress was concerned with the fact that shareholders too
often cast their proxies with little understanding of the actual issue in question. Id.
37. See Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (test for materiality
under rule 14a-9 includes determination of whether misstated or omitted fact could have influenced
reasonable shareholder's voting decision).
38. See J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964) (Congress designed § 14(a)
to ensure informed shareholder voting); Proxy Regulation: Ensuring Accurate Disclosure Through
a Negligence Standard, 50 FoRanmia L. REv. 1423, 1426 (1982) (Congress enacted § 14(a) to
promote informed shareholder voting) [hereinafter cited as Proxy Regulation].
39. See Proxy Regulation, supra note 38, at 1426 (Congress designed § 14(a) to shed light
of publicity on proxy transactions). Congress did not design § 14(a) to serve as a prohibition
against the use of proxies. Id.
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In promoting the congressional purpose of informed shareholder voting
under section 14(a), the lack of an explicit standard of liability has forced
courts to create a standard for rule 14a-9 violations.4 0 Federal courts are in
general agreement that negligence is the proper standard of liability under rule
14a-9.4 ' For example, in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. ,42 the Second Cir-
cuit decided that negligence is sufficient to warrant recovery in a rule 14a-9
action.43 Gerstle involved a class action by stockholders of an outdoor adver-
tising company that had merged into defendant Gamble-Skogmo."' The plaintiff
class claimed that Gamble-Skogmo procurred the merger through the use of
a false and misleading proxy statement.45 In assessing the standard of liability
for violations of SEC rule 14a-9, the Second Circuit contrasted the language
of section 14(a) with the language of section 10(b) of the '34 Act. 46 The Gerstle
court noted that while section 10(b) refers to manipulative or deceptive activity,
section 14(a) is devoid of any language indicating a prohibition on fraud or
deception .4 The Second Circuit further stated that courts have applied a scienter
standard under rule lOb-5 because any other standard would exceed the SEC's
authority under section 10(b) to regulate only manipulative or deceptive devices
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 48 The Gerstle court ex-
plained that the rulemaking authority granted the SEC under section 14(a)
is broad, contains no words of limitation, and extends to all regulation necessary
to protect securities investors. 49 The Second Circuit stated that Congress in-
40. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1983) (rule 14a-9 does not state standard of liability for
proxy statement antifraud violations).
41. See, e.g., Gruss v. Curtis Publishing Co., 534 F.2d 1396, 1403 (2d Cir.) (negligence
is standard of liability under rule 14a-9), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 887 (1976); Halpern v. Arm-
strong, 491 F. Supp. 365, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (no need to show intent to defraud in § 14(a)
action); Bertoglio v. Texas Int'l. Co., 488 F. Supp. 630, 651 (D. Del. 1980) (lower courts agree
negligence is standard in 14a-9 action); Del Noce v. Delyar Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 95,670, at 90,284 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1976) (negligence sufficient
basis for rule 14a-9 liability); Berman v. Thomson, 403 F. Supp. 695, 699 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (negligent
conduct imposes liability under § 14(a)); Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 n.12 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (plaintiff need not prove scienter under § 14(a)). The Supreme Court has never determined
what the proper standard of liability is in a § 14(a) action. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444 n.7 (1976) (declining to address standard of culpability necessary to establish
§ 14(a) liability).
42. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
43. Id. at 1299, 1301.
44. Id. at 1283.
45. Id. at 1291. The plaintiffs in Gerstle alleged that the proxy statement violated § 14(e)
because the proxy statement inadequately disclosed the market value of the advertising company's
remaining advertising plants. Id.
46. Id. at 1299; see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (prohibiting use of manipulative or deceptive
devices in connection with the purchase or sale of securities).
47. 478 F.2d at 1299; see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (prohibiting use of manipulative or
deceptive devices in purchase or sale of securities); id. § 78n(a) (prohibiting proxy solicitations
in violation of rules SEC promulgates); supra notes 6-10, 36-38 and accompanying text (discus-
sion of § 14(a)); supra note 11 (discussion of § 10(b)).
48. 478 F.2d at 1299.
49. Id.
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tended the broad language of section 14(a) to protect the outside investor,
or shareholder, who possesses a sought-after proxy, and that courts may im-
pose liability under rule 14a-9 without an allegation of scienter."s The Gerstle
court added in dicta that the court's application of a negligence standard of
liability to Gamble-Skogmo's violation of rule 14a-9 does not mean that federal
courts should never require a scienter standard in a rule 14a-9 action."' For
example, the court suggested that the presence or absence of privity between
the issuer of a proxy statement and shareholders might affect the applicable
standard of liability.52 The Second Circuit stated that the facts and circum-
stances in Gerstle required the application of a negligence standard of liability. 3
Although the Gerstle court applied a negligence standard of liability to
a rule 14a-9 violation by a corporate insider, the Third Circuit has held that
negligence is also the appropriate standard for a proxy statement antifraud
violation by an outside, non-management director.5 4 In Gould v. American-
Hawaiian Steamship Co.,"- a class of shareholders of McLean Industries
brought suit alleging that the defendants procurred a merger of McLean In-
dustries into the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company with a misleading proxy
statement. 56 One of the defendants claimed that he should be subject to a
scienter standard of liability because of his status as an outside, non-
management director. 7 The Third Circuit, however, rejected the defendant's
argument and held that even outside directors must be subject to a negligence
standard of liability." The Gould court, like the Second Circuit in Gerstle,
noted that the actual language of section 14(a) and rule 14a-9 does not suggest
the imposition of a scienter requirement." Moreover, the Third Circuit noted
that persuasive precedent existed favoring the application of a negligence stan-
dard of liability to proxy solicitations under rule 14a-9. 66
The Gould court also analogized rule 14a-9 with section 11 of the Securities
50. Id. at 1299, 1301. The Gerstle Court stated that the imposition of a broad negligence
standard of liability would strengthen the high duty of care already owed by a corporation to




54. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777 (3d Cir. 1976) (negligence
is proper standard of liability to apply to outside director in rule 14a-9 action).
55. 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
56. Id. 767-68. The plaintiffs in Gould alleged that the proxy solicitation violated rule 14a-9
because the solicitation falsely stated that certain parties had approved the merger and failed
to disclose that certain parties possessed veto power over the entire transaction. Id. at 769-70.
57. Id. at 777.
58. Id. at 777-78.
59. Id. at 777; see supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text (discussion of Gerstle).
60. 535 F.2d at 777; see Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300-01 (2d Cir.
1973) (negligence standard of liability proper under rule 14a-9); Berman v. Thomson, 403 F.
Supp. 695, 699 (N.D. 111. 1975) (negligent conduct imposes liability under § 14(a)); Norte & Co.
v. Huffines, 304 F. Supp. 1096, 1109-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (scienter not essential to § 14(a) claim),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(plaintiff need not prove scienter under § 14(a)).
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Act of 1933 ('33 Act).61 Section 11 explicitly applies a negligence standard
of liability to claims by a person obtaining a security when the registration
statement for that security contains a misstatement or omission of a material
fact.62 The Third Circuit found in comparing rule 14a-9 and section 11 that
both provisoins proscribed the use of misleading statements or omissions of
material fact, and that both provisions involved specific documents from funda-
mental areas of securities regulation.6 3 The Gould court stated that because
of the parallel between section 11 and rule 14a-9, and because section 11 re-
quires a negligence standard of liability, courts should apply a negligence stan-
dard of liability to rule 14a-9 violators. 6" The Gould court, therefore, held
that outside, non-management directors are subject to the same negligence
standard of liability under rule 14a-9 that the Gerstle court applied to an in-
sider's violation of rule 14a-9.6 5
The Sixth Circuit in Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc.,66 however,
complicated the heretofore settled proxy statement standard of liability.6 7 The
Adams court held that an accountant should be subject to a scienter standard
of liability under rule 14a-9 for misstatements contained in a proxy statement.
68
In Adams, a class of shareholders sued the defendant accounting firm for
alleged violations of sections 10(b) and 14(a) of the '34 Act.6 9 Specifically,
the plaintiff class alleged that the defendant accounting firm violated SEC
rule 14a-9 by omitting material information from a proxy statement used to
effect a merger.10 The Sixth Circuit relief heavily upon the legislative history
61. 535 F.2d at 777. Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) provides a cause
of action for any person acquiring a security when the effective registration statement for that
security contains a false statement of material fact or omitted to state a material fact. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(a) (1982). The person acquiring the security may then sue certain corporate insiders and
specified outsiders responsible for drafting and executing the registration statement. Id.
§ 77k(a)(1)-(5). Section 11 requires a negligence standard of liability. Id. § 77k(a); see Gould
v. American-Hawaiin S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777 (3d Cir. 1976) (§ 11 establishes negligence
standard of liability); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951) (§ 11
does not require proof of fraud); Straus v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 729, 732 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (§ 11 violation requires negligence standard of liability).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1982); see supra note 61 (discussing § 11 of '33 Act).
63. 535 F.2d at 777; see 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982) (providing cause of action for any person
acquiring security when registration statement contains material misstatements or omissions); 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1983) (prohibiting material misstatement or omission in proxy solicitation).
64. 535 F.2d at 777.
65. Id. at 778. The Gould court confirmed its negligence standard for determining the proper
standard of liability under § 14(a) and rule 14a-9 by citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976), for the proposition that the language and purpose of the provision in question
are the important considerations for determining the standard of liability. 535 F.2d at 778; see
infra notes 88-99 and accompanying text (discussion of Hochfelder).
66. 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
67. Id. at 431.
68. Id. at 425, 431.
69. Id. at 423-24.
70. Id. at 424. In Adams, the plaintiffs alleged that the proxy solicitation violated rule
14a-9 because the solicitation failed to state that restrictions on the payment of dividends by
the acquiring corporation applied to preferred as well as common stock. Id. The transaction
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of section 14(a) in finding that Congress intended to prohibit wrongdoing ac-
companied by some degree of knowledge in connection with proxy
solicitations. 7' Since the Adams court discovered numerous references to know-
ing conduct and manipulative intent within the '34 Act's congressional
documents, the court decided that scienter was the proper standard of liability
in suits under rule 14a-9 for proxy statement antifraud violations.72 Addition-
ally, the Sixth Circuit equated the regulation of tender offers under section
14(e) with the regulation of proxies under section 14(a). 71 The Adams court
stated that in passing the Williams Act, Congress intended that proxy statements
and tender offers be regulated by the same standards. 74 The Sixth Circuit
reasoned that because tender offers are subject to a scienter standard of liability,
proxy statements should be subject to the same standard. 7 The Adams court
concluded that because the accounting firm was not in privity with the
shareholders and because the accounting firm did not benefit directly from
the proxy vote, the accountants should not be held to the same high duty
of care as a corporate insider.76
in Adams concerned a merger of Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., into Chadbourn, Inc. Id. The
stockholders of Standard Knitting Mills agreed to the merger and consented to exchange their
shares in Standard Knitting Mills for a package of Chadbourn securities. Id. Standard Knitting
Mills obtained the consent of its shareholders by a proxy statement that contained the financial
statements of Chadbourn as prepared by the defendant accounting firm. Id.
71. Id. at 429-30; see infra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing congressional documents
examined by Adams court in determining congressional intent behind § 14(a)).
72. 623 F.2d at 429-30. In examining the legislative history of § 14(a), the Adams court
cited a Senate report, floor debates, and a committee report. Id.; S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 77 (1934), reprinted in 5 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAAR, LEGISLATrvE HISTORY OF THE
SEcurrr~s ACT OF 1933 AD SECulUTms EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, item 21 (1973) (§ 14(a) intended
to prevent concealing and distorting of facts in proxy statements by corporate officials); Hearings
on H.R. 7852 Before The House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 480 (1934), reprinted in 8 J. ELLENBRGER & E. MAHAR, supra, item 23 (equating fraudulent
activity of directors in using misleading proxy statements with larceny); 78 CoNo. REc. 7961
(1934) (statement by Mr. Dirksen) (drafters of § 14(a) concerned with unscrupulous acts); 78
CONG. REc. 7961 (1934) (statement by Mr. Wadsworth) (proxies used for purposes of manipula-
tion); 78 CONG. Rac. 7713 (1934) (statement by Mr. Wadsworth) (seeking prohibition against
proxy solicitations that conceal illegal acts of corporate insiders); see also H.R. RP. No. 1383,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934), reprinted in 5 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, supra, item 18
(exhibiting concern for deliberate misuse of proxies to benefit individuals in control of corpora-
tion); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934), reprinted in 5 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR,
supra, item 17 (discussing failure of corporate insiders to inform shareholders of purpose for
proxy); S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1934), reprinted in 5 J. ELLENBERGER & E.
MAHAR, supra, item 21 (Congress concerned with actual intent to deceive in proxy solicitations).
The Adams court noted that the legislative history of § 14(a) never stated that Congress intended
to protect the public from the negligence of accountants. 623 F.2d at 430.
73. 623 F.2d at 428.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. In addition to stating that the accounting firm was not in privity with the shareholders,
the Adams court also reasoned that if the federal courts apply a negligence standard to accoun-
tants, accountants would potentially be subject to enormous liability for minor mistakes. Id.
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit equated the regulation of tender offers under § 14(e) with the
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Although the Sixth Circuit's application of a scienter standard of liability
to rule 14a-9 violations appears to conflict with the Second Circuit's adoption
of a negligence standard of liability, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio harmonized the decisions of the two circuits in
Fradkin v. Ernst." The Fradkin court followed the holding of the Gerstle
court by holding the corporate officials responsible for drafting a proxy state-
ment to a negligence standard of liability."8 In Fradkin, the Mohawk Rubber
Company sought to implement a stock option plan for two senior executives.
7
To speed board approval of the stock option plan, Mohawk telephoned the
directors personally and obtained unanimous consent to adopt the plan. 0 The
proxy materials that Mohawk distributed to obtain shareholder approval of
the plan, however, stated that the board had approved the compensation plan
at a formal meeting. 8' Plaintiff Fradkin brought a shareholder derivative ac-
tion under section 14(a) claiming that the proxy statement issued by Mohawk
was materially misleading. 2 In determining that the proxy solicitation con-
tained false and misleading statements of fact, the district court examined the
standards of liability other courts had applied to rule 14a-9 violations. 3 The
Fradkin court examined the Gerstle negligence standard and the Adams scienter
standard and recognized that the holdings in Gerstle and Adams were
harmonious.8 ' The district court reasoned that the Gerstle negligence stan-
dard applies when the defendant is a corporate official who potentially could
benefit from a misleading proxy statement. 85 The Fradkin court, however,
regulation of proxies under § 14(a). Id. at 430. The Adams court stated that in passing the Williams
Act, Congress intended that proxy statements and tender offers be regulated by the same stan-
dard. Id. The Sixth Circuit concluded that because tender offers are subject to a scienter standard
of liability, proxy statements should be subject to the same standard. Id.
77. 571 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
78. Id. at 843.
79. Id. at 833-36.
80. Id. at 836. In Fradkin, the president of Mohawk telephoned each individual board member
to speed board approval of a stock option plan for two senior executives because Mohawk's
president was concerned that Mohawk would soon become a takeover target. Id. Part of the
proposed compensation plan involved the requirement that the executives surrender unexercised
options for a cash premium in the event of a merger, acquisition or consolidation. Id. at 835.
The directors had no prior notice of the proposed plan or the telephone calls and at no time
were all of the directors on the phone simultaneously. Id. at 836. Mohawk had minutes prepared
that outlined the telephone disucssions as though the plan had been approved at a formal meeting.
Id. at 837.
81. Id. at 837. The stock option plan in Fradkin required shareholder approval of the plan
in order to exempt the plan from the short-swing profit rules contained in rule 16b-3 of the '34
Act. Id. at 836; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (1983) (shares acquired through stock option plan
not subject to short-swing profit rules if majority of stockholders approve plan).
82. 571 F. Supp. at 832.
83. Id. at 842-43, 846. The Fradkin court found that because the proxy indicated that a
valid meeting of Mohawk directors had approved the stock option plan, the proxy was materially
false and misleading. Id.
84. 571 F. Supp. at 843.
85. Id.; see Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1381, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973) (corporate
insider subject to negligence standard under rule 14a-9).
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stated that the Adams scienter standard applies when the defendant is not
in a position to benefit directly from a misleading proxy statement.86 Since
the defendants in Fradkin could have benefitted from the misstatement in the
proxy solicitation, the district court applied a negligence standard in finding
a violation of rule 14a-9.17
Seven years before the Fradkin decision, the Supreme Court in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder8 created a formula for determining the proper standard
of liability under any provision of the federal securities laws.8 9 In Hochfelder,
the president of a small brokerage firm executed a fraudulent securities scheme
resulting in the loss of investors' money.90 The brokerage firm retained the
defendant accounting firm to periodically audit the brokerage firm's books
and records. 9' The plaintiff customers of the brokerage firm brought suit against
the accounting firm alleging that the accounting firm's failure to utilize proper
auditing procedures in auditing the brokerage firm violated section 10(b) of
the '34 act and rule lOb-5 by aiding the brokerage firm's fraudulent securities
scheme. 92 The Hochfelder Court employed a three part analysis to determine
the proper standard of liability for cases involving violations of section 10(b)
of the '34 Act and SEC rule lOb-5. 93 First, the Supreme Court examined the
86. 571 F. Supp. at 843; see Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 431
(6th Cir.) (outside accountant subject to scienter standard of liability under rule 14a-9), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
87. 571 F. Supp. at 843.
88. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
89. See id. at 197-211 (examining statutory language, legislative history, and regulatory
scheme of rule lOb-5).
90. Id. at 188-89. In Mhchfelder, the president of a small brokerage firm persuaded customers
to invest in escrow accounts that would produce a high rate of return. Id. at 189. No escrow
accounts actually existed and the president of the firm converted the customers' investment to
personal use. Id. The escrow accounts were not shown in the books or records of the brokerage
firm. Id. The president of the brokerage firm later revealed his scheme in a suicide note. Id.
91. Id. at 188.
92. Id. at 189-90. The plaintiff customers in Hochfelder contended that a proper audit
would have uncovered the rule instituted at the brokerage firm that only the president could
open mall addressed to the president. Id. at 190. The plaintiffs reasoned that a discovery of
the "mall rule" would have been disclosed to the SEC as an irregular practice by the accounting
firm and the SEC would have had to investigate the brokerage firm. Id.
93. Id. at 197-211. The Supreme Court in Aaron v. SEC utilized an analysis similar to
that used in Hochfelder. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689-700 (1980); infra text accompany-
ing notes 86-88 (listing three part analysis employed by Hochfelder court in determining standard
of liability under rule lOb-5). The issue in Aaron was whether a plaintiff must prove scienter
under § 17(a) of the '33 Act. 446 U.S. at 695-700; see 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1982) (prohibiting use
of fraudulent or manipulative activity in offer or sale of security). The Aaron Court, however,
only evaluated two of the three steps found in the Hochfelder analysis since the Court found
the statutory language and the legislative history of § 17(a) dispositive on the issue of the stan-
dard of liability. See 446 U.S. at 700 n.19; infra text accompanying notes 93-98 (discussing three
part analysis used by Hochfelder Court). The Aaron Court stated that § 17(a)(l) requires a scienter
standard of liability because words of fraud and deceit are found in § 17(a)(1). 446 U.S. at 696-97.
The Supreme Court also found that § 17(a)(2) and § 17(a)(3) do not require a showing of scienter
because the statutory language of each provision is devoid of any suggestion of a scienter require-
ment. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (1982) (prohibiting use of untrue statement of fact or material
omission to obtain money or property in the offer or sale of securities); id. § 77q(a)(3) (pro-
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specific statutory language of the '34 Act for evidence of the proper standard
of liability.9" The Court found that the use of the words "manipulative or
deceptive" in section 10(b) implied that Congress intended to prohibit know-
ing or intentional misconduct in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security. 9" Second, the Hochfelder Court scurtinized the legislative history of
section 10(b) for an explanation of the congressional intent in enacting the
provision.'6 In examining the legislative history of section 10(b), the Court
found that Congress intended to prohibit only manipulative activities accom-
panied by scienter. 97 Finally, the Supreme Court in Hochfelder compared and
contrasted section 10(b) with various sections of the federal securities laws
to determine the standard of liability most compatible with the general securities
regulation scheme.' 8 After considering the statutory language and legislative
history of section 10(b), and section 10(b)'s role in the federal securities regula-
tion scheme, the Hochfelder Court concluded that a private right of action
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 would not succeed unless the plaintiff alleged
scienter. 9
A Hochfelder analysis of section 14(a) and rule 14a-9, combined with the
Adams holding that accountants are subject to a scienter standard of liability
under rule 14a-9, indicates that the correct standard of liability for rule 14a-9
violations is not clear.'00 Consistent with the first element of the Hochfelder
hibiting any practice or transaction that would operate as a fraud on the purchaser in the offer
or sale of securities). Additionally, the Aaron Court held that although the legislative history
of § 17(a) was ambiguous, § 17(a)'s legislative history is consistent with the plain meaning of
§ 17(a). 446 U.S. at 699-700.
Although the Hochfelder Court held that a plaintiff must prove scienter in a rule lOb-5 ac-
tion, the Court refused to address whether reckless behavior will satisfy the scienter standard
of liability under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 425 U.S. at 193 n.12. Recklessness is traditionally defined
as highly unreasonable conduct that departs from the standards of ordinary care. See Sundstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir.) (recklessness is a departure from
standards of ordinary care), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). Lower federal courts are in general
agreement that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement in rule lOb-5 actions. See, e.g.,
Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023-24 (6th Cir. 1979) (reckless behavior
satisfies scienter requirement in rule 10b-5 action); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th
Cir.) (Congress intended § 10(b) to extend to reckless conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978);
Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.) (recklessness satisfies scienter
in rule lob-5 case), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d
569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977) (plaintiff may recover in rule lOb-5 action for reckless misrepresenta-
tions), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978); First Virginia Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307,
1314 (5th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff may prove reckless disregard of falsity of information in rule lOb-5
action), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d
1033, 1049-50 (7th Cir.) (lower court acted correctly in applying recklessness standard in rule
lOb-5 action), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
94. 425 U.S. at 197-201.
95. Id. at 199-201.
96. Id. at 201-06.
97. Id. at 203, 206.
98. Id. at 206-11.
99. Id. at 212-14.
100. See infra notes 101-26 and accompanying text (analyzing rule 14a-9 under Hochfelder
formula and Adams decision).
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formula for determining the proper standard of liability under the securities
laws, other Supreme Court cases have stressed that the language of a securities
statute is the starting point for every statutory construction problem.' 0' Sec-
tion 14(a), however, contains no language indicative of the proper standard
of liability for proxy statement antifraud violations.0 2 Instead, the language
of section 14(a) is broad, not limited by words of fraud or deceit, and extends
to all proxy regulation necessary to protect the interests of investors.' 3 The
broad language of section 14(a) illustrates that Congress intended to grant
the SEC almost unlimited rulemaking authority to protect investors from proxy
statement abuse.'04 Additionally, the language of section 14(a) and rule 14a-9
indicates an intent to prohibit the potentially devastating effects of misstate-
ments on investors instead of establishing the extent of a violator's liability. 0 1
The absence of language within rule 14a-9 specifically prohibiting. fraudulent
conduct, therefore, implies that a negligence standard of liability instead of
the Hochfelder scienter standard is appropriate in proxy statement antifraud
case.'
0 6
The second step in the Hochfelder analysis for determining the proper
standard of liability in a federal securities law case is an examination of the
relevant provision's legislative history.10 7 The Hochfelder Court emphasized
that it examined the legislative history of section 10(b) only to confirm the
court's interpretation of the statutory language of section 10(b) which clearly
101. See 425 U.S. at 200 (ascertaining standard of liability depends upon statutory language);
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) (begin
with language of statute in statutory construction); supra text accompanying note 94 (first re-
quirement under Hochfelder formula involves examination of statutory language).
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982) (statute devoid of proper standard of liability); supra
notes 6-10 and accompanying text (discussing § 14(a) and rule 14a-9).
103. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299 (1973) (§ 14(a) not limited
by words connoting fraud and extends to protect investors); supra notes 6-8 and accompanying
text (discussing § 14(a)).
104. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299 (1973) (rulemaking authority
given by Congress to SEC is broad and extends to all regulations necessary to protect investors).
105. See Proxy Regulation, supra note 38, at 1431 (§ 14(a) focuses on protecting investors
rather than on establishing standard of liability). In determining the proper standard of liability
under § 17(a) of the '33 Act, the Supreme Court in Aaron v. SEC focused on whether the language
of § 17(a) was regulatory or designed to provide relief. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980);
see 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982) (prohibiting fraudulent interstate transactions in connection with
offer or sale of securities), supra note 93 (discussing Aaron and § 17(a)). The Aaron Court found
that the wording of § 17(a)(3), specifically the positioning of the word "operate" before "fraud"
and "deceit", indicated that § 17(a)(3) focused upon the effect of wrongful conduct rather than
upon the culpability of violators. 446 U.S. at 696-97. The focus of § 17(a)(3) persuaded the Court
to hold that a plaintiff need not prove scienter in a § 17(a)(3) action. Id. at 697.
106. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (words prohibiting fraudulent
conduct in securities statute require imposition of scienter standard of liability); Proxy Regula-
tion, supra note 38, at 1430 (negligence standard of liability appropriate when statute does not
contain language prohibiting fraudulent conduct).
107. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201-06 (1976) (second step in Hochfelder
test is examination of legislative history).
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proscribed intentional misconduct." 8 The legislative history of section 14(a)
of the '34 Act does not refer to a specific standard of liability for proxy state-
ment antifraud violations. 0 9 The Sixth Circuit in Adams, however, closely
examined the legislative history of section 14(a) and concluded that because
the applicable congressional documents contained numerous references to
wrongdoing coupled with intent, Congress intended scienter to be the proper
standard of liability."0 Despite the Adams court's thorough examination of
the legislative history of section 14(a), other courts determining the proper
standard of liability in a section 14(a) action have not examined legislative
history but have instead concentrated on statutory language."' A conflict,
therefore, arises in identifying the proper standard of liability under section
14(a) because the scienter oriented legislative history does not confimn the find-
ing of most courts that the statutory language of section 14(a) requires a
negligence standard of liability." 2
The final step in the Hochfelder formula for determining a standard of
liability in federal securities cases focuses on the fact that the federal securities
laws as a whole comprise a general regulatory scheme of interrelated
components.1 3 The Hochfelder Court recognized that a relevant factor in in-
terpreting statutory language is the relative interdependence and similarity of
diverse provisions of the securities laws.' "' A comparison of section 14(a) and
108. See id. at 201. The Hochfelder Court determined that the language of § 10(b) clearly
prohibited misconduct accompanied by some degree of scienter. Id. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court examined the legislative history of the '34 Act to reinforce its reading of the statutory
language of § 10(b). Id.
109. See Proxy Regulation, supra note 38, at 1483 (legislative history of § 14(a) void of
standard of liability).
110. See 623 F.2d at 429-30. Notwithstanding the Adams decision, some federal courts have
failed to find the legislative history of federal securities laws decisive in ascertaining congressional
intent. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697-700 (1980) (legislative history of § 17(a) am-
biguous); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201-02 (1976) (legislative history of § 10(b)
lacks thorough explanation of congressional intent); SEC v. American Realty Trust, 586 F.2d
1001, 1006 (4th Cir. 1978) (legislative history of § 17 of '33 Act contains no indication of congres-
sional intent); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 860 (D. Del. 1972)
(legislative history of § 14(a) provides no assistance in divining standard of liability), aff'd, 535
F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
111. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1976) (no
discussion of legislative history of § 14(a); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1298-1301
(2d Cir. 1973) (standard of liability determined without examination of legislative history of
§ 14(a)); Fradkin v. Ernst, 571 F. Supp. 829, 842-43 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (no discussion of legislative
history of § 14(a)); supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text (discussion of Adams).
112. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (Adams court decision that legislative
history of § 14(a) requires scienter standard of liability); supra notes 46-50, 59 and accompanying
text (examination of statutory language of § 14(a) in Gerstle and Gould indicates negligence is
proper standard of liability).
113. See 425 U.S. at 206 (third step in Hochfelder test is comparison with other securities
provisions to determine compatibility with securities regulation scheme); see also Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 727-30 (1975) ('33 Act and '34 Act are interrelated com-
ponents of federal securities regulatory scheme).
114. 425 U.S. at 206; see SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453,466 (1969) (interdependence
of securities laws crucial to interpretation of statutory language).
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rule 14a-9 with similar provisions of the securities laws, therefore, should aid
in determining whether a negligence or scienter standard under section 14(a)
and rule 14a-9 is compatible with the general securities regulatory scheme." '
The language of SEC rule 14a-9 concerning misstatements and omissions
is identical to the language contained in sections 11 and 17(a)(2) of the '33
Act."' Section 17(a)(2) prohibits the use of an untrue statement of material
fact or an omission of material fact to obtain money or property in the offer
or sale of any security. ' 7 Section 11 provides for civil liability for misstatements
or omissions contained in an effective registration statement." 8 Federal courts
unanimously agree that section 11 violators are subject to a negligence stan-
dard of liability." 9 Likewise, the Supreme Court, concentrating on the statutory
language of section 17(a), has held that a negligence standard of liability ap-
plies to section 17(a)(2). 2 °
In contrast to the statutory language of section 11 and section 17(a)(2),
the actual language of section 14(a) contains no reference to material
misstatements or omissions.I 2' Rule 14a-9 contains relatively neutral language
prohibiting material misstatements or omissions in proxy solicitations., 2 In
rule 14a-9, the SEC chose to employ language similar to section 11 and sec-
tion 17(a)(2) instead of implementing stronger language prohibiting intentional
misconduct as found in section 10(b).' 23 By opting for the neutral language
found in rule 14a-9, the SEC apparently desired not to limit the application
115. See Proxy Regulation, supra note 38, at 1434 (comparing § 14(a) with other securities
laws to determine compatibility with securities regulation scheme).
116. See 15 U.S.C. § 77a(a)(2) (1982) (prohibits obtaining money or property through offer
or sale of securities by use of false material fact or omission of material fact); id. § 77k (pro-
hibiting false material fact or material omission in effective registration statement); supra notes
9-10 and accompanying text (explanation of SEC rule 14a-9); supra note 61 (explanation of sec-
tion 11 of '34 Act). Section 17(a) of the '33 Act outlaws fraudulent interstate securities trans-
actions. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1982). Specifically, § 17(a)(2) makes it unlawful for any person, in
the offer or sale or securities, to obtain money or property by means of an untrue statement
of material fact or a material omission. Id. § 77q(a)(2).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (1982); see supra note 116 (discussion of § 17(a)(2)).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982); see supra note 61 (discussion of § 11).
119. See supra note 61 (citing cases holding that negligence standard of liability applies under
§ 11).
120. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695-97, 702 (1980). In addition to holding that a
negligence standard of liability applies under § 17(a)(2), the Aaron court held that a negligence
standard of liability also applies under § 17(a)(3) because of the statutory language of § 17(a)(3).
Id. at 697; see 15 U.S.C. § 17(a)(3) (1982) (prohibiting any person from engaging in transaction
or practice which operates as fraud or deceit upon purchaser of securities); supra note 93 (discussing
§ 17(a)(3)).
121. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982) (no language in § 14(a) referring to misstatements or
omissions); supra note 61 (discussion of § 11); supra note 116 (discussion of § 17(a)(2)).
122. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1983) (prohibiting misstatements or omissions in connection
with proxy solicitations).
123. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982) (prohibiting misstatements or omissions in effective registration
statement); id. § 77q(a)(2) (prohibits obtaining money or property by use of misstatements or
omissions in offer or sale of securities); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1983) (prohibiting misstatements
or omissions in proxy solicitations).
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of rule 14a-9 to situations involving only knowing misconduct."' As the Sec-
ond Circuit stated in Gerstle, the scope of section 14(a) is broad and extends
to all regulation "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors."' 25 A negligence standard of liability under rule 14a-9,
therefore, is compatible with the statutory scheme of permitting a neiligence
standard of liability when the language of a securities provision is neutral and
does not specifically prohibit intentional misconduct.
126
In contrast to section 14(a), a Hochfelder analysis of section 14(e) indicates
that courts are justified in assigning a scienter standard to tender offer anti-
fraud cases.' 27 An examination of the statutory language of section 14(e)
demonstrates that, unlike section 14(a), Congress chose to limit section 14(e)
by utilizing express language which strongly suggests that Congress intended
section 14(e) to proscribe intentional or knowing misconduct.2" The words
"fraudulent," "deceptive," and "manipulative" as found in section 14(e),
though not contained in rule 14a-9, have been held by the Supreme Court
to imply that Congress intended to prohibit conduct accompanied by some
degree of scienter.' 29 Moreover, federal courts have held that since SEC rule
10b-5 also proscribes fraudulent conduct, the elements of a section 14(e) viola-
tion, including an allegation of scienter, are identical to those under rule
lOb-5.13" The statutory language of section 14(e), therefore, indicates that
124. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1983) (language of rule 14a-9 does not refer to knowing
misconduct).
125. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973).
126. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980) (language of § 17(a)(2) requires imposition
of negligence standard); supra note 61 (citing cases holding that negligence standard of liability
applies under language of § 11); 17 C.F.R § 240.14a-9 (1983) (language of rule 14a-9 does not
refer to knowing misconduct).
An additional argument for the proposition that a negligence standard of liability under
rule 14a-9 follows the statutory scheme is that the plaintiff in a rule 14a-9 action is a voting
shareholder while § 11 and § 17(a)(2) plaintiffs are securities investors. Compare 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-9 (1983) (applies to shareholder receiving proxy solicitation) with 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982)
(applies to any person purchasing securities) and id. § 77q(a)(2) (applies to purchaser of securities);
see also Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978) (implying private right of
action under § 17), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979). It is improbable that Congress intended
to assign less protection to a voting shareholder under the securities laws than to purchasers by
implying a scienter standard of liability under rule 14a-9. See Proxy Regulation, supra note 38,
at 1438.
127. See supra note 16 (listing cases holding that scienter is proper standard of liability under
section 14(e)).
128. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) (§ 14(e) contains language prohibiting intentional miscon-
duct); supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (explaining content of § 14(e)).
129. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696 (1980) (words of fraud or deception contained
in § 17(a)(1) illustrate congressional intent to proscribe knowing conduct); Ernst & Ernst v. Hoch-
felder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (words of fraud or deception indicate imposition of scienter
standard of liability); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) (§ 14(e) contains language prohibiting intentional
misconduct); Proxy Regulation, supra note 38, at 1436-37 (language of § 14(e) implies scienter
standard of liability); supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (explaining content of § 14(e)).
130. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir.) (elements of
§ 14(e) violation identical to elements of rule 1Ob-5 violation), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974);
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scienter is the proper standard of liability for a violation of section 14(e).131
An examination of the legislative history of section 14(e) indicates that
Congress included no reference to the proper standard of liability applicable
to tender offer antifraud violations."' The only assistance that the legislative
history of section 14(e) furnishes is in determining the purpose behind the
congressional enactment of section 14(e). 33 According to the legislative history
of the Williams Act, Congress intended section 14(e) to promote full and fair
disclosure of information a shareholder requires in deciding whether to tender
his shares to a tender offeror./3' The Williams Act's legislative history also
indicates that Congress designed section 14(e) equitably so that neither manage-
ment nor the tender offeror occupies a favored position during a hostile tender
offer.' The legislative history of section 14(e), however, is silent concerning
the proper standard of liability for tender offer antifraud violations."
6
In accord with the third step of the Hochfelder test, a comparison of the
statutory language of section 14(e) with the language of sections 17(a)(1) and
10(b) of the '34 Act indicates that a scienter standard of liability conforms
to the statutory scheme of the federal securities laws."17 Section 17(a)(1) of
the '33 Act prohibits the employment of any device or scheme to defraud
purchasers of securities.' 3' The Supreme Court has ruled that the intent oriented
language of section 17(a)(1) requires the application of a scienter standard
of liability to section 17(a)(1) violators. 39 In the same opinion, however, the
Indiana Nat'l Bank v. Mobil Oil Corp., 457 F. Supp. 1028, 1032 (S.D. Ind. 1977) (§ 14(e) is
counterpart to rule 10b-5); Applied Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145,
1157 (S.D.NY. 1977) (elements of § 14(e) violation identical to elements of rule lOb-5 violation).
131. See 425 U.S. at 214-15 (scienter is proper standard of liability for violation of rule 10b-5).
132. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1967) (Senate never refers to standard
of liability for § 14(e)); H.R. RaP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 2811, 2811-23 (House never refers to standard of liability for
§ 14(e)); 113 CoNG. REc. 24662-67 (1967) (no reference to standard of liability in report on disclosure
of corporate equity ownership); supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (discussion of § 14(e)).
133. See Proposed Definition, supra note 12, at 700 (primary objectives of Congress in enacting
§ 14(e) found in legislative history).
134. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1967) (stressing need for disclosure
of material information to shareholder caught in proxy battle to aid shareholder in deciding how
to vote); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2811, 2813 (§ 14(e) designed to require full disclosure).
135. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967) (Congress took care to avoid tip-
ping balance to management or offeror during tender offer); H.R. REp. No. 1711, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 2811, 2813 (Congress avoided
tipping balance during tender offers to management or offeror).
136. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (discussion of § 14(e)); supra note 132
and accompanying text (legislative history of § 14(e) does not prescribe proper standard of liability).
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) (prohibiting fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative activity
in connection with tender offer); id. § 77q(a)(1) (prohibiting employment of device or scheme
to defraud in offer or sale of securities); id. § 78j(b) (prohibiting use of manipulative or deceptive
devices in connection with purchase or sale of securities).
138. See id. § 77q(a)(1) (prohibiting use of device or scheme to defraud in offer or sale
of securities).




Supreme Court held that the more neutral language of sections 17(a)(2) and
17(a)(3) necessitates a negligence standard of liability.1 41 Rule lOb-5, promul-
gated by the SEC under section 10(b), prohibits manipulative or deceptive
devices in connection with the purchase or sale of any security in three subsec-
tions identical to the three subsections of section 17(a).' 4 According to the
Supreme Court in Hochfelder, however, all three subsections of rule 1Ob-5
are subject to a scienter standard of liability primarily because of the language
contained in section 10(b). ' 1 The implementation of a single standard of lia-
bility under rule lOb-5 is consistent with Congress' choice of a section heading
for section 10 which clearly limits the scope of section 10 to manipulative
and deceptive devices. 143 Imposing differing standards of liability under the
subsections of rule 10b-5, like the differing standards required by the Supreme
Court under the subsections of section 17(a), therefore, would exceed the
authority that Congress granted the SEC under section 10(b) to regulate only
manipulative or deceptive activity.'44 In keeping with the scheme instituted
by the Supreme Court in Hochfelder, and the Supreme Court decision deter-
mining the standard of liability under section 17(a), the language of section
14(e) would seemingly require that a scienter standard of liability be applied
to tender offer antifraud violations.' 45
A potential problem, however, could arise in conducting a statutory scheme
analysis of section 14(e).' 6 Although Congress did not separate section 14(e)
into subsections, section 14(e) does consist of two distinct clauses. ' 7 The first
clause of section 14(e) prohibits the use of an untrue statements of a material
fact or an omission of any material fact in connection with a tender offer.'
4 8
The language of the first clause of section 14(e) precisely tracks the language
of section 17(a)(2) to which the Supreme Court has applied a negligence stan-
140. Id.; see supra note 93 (discussing § 17(a)(2) and § 17(a)(3)).
141. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77q(1) (1982) (unlawful to use device or scheme to defraud in
offer or sale of securities) and id. § 77q(a)(3) (unlawful to participate in fraudulent or deceitful
transaction in offer or sale of securities) with 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (1983) (unlawful to use
device or scheme to defraud in purchase or sale of securities) and id. § 240.10b-5(b) (unlawful
to use misstatement or omission in purchase or sale of securities) and id. § 240.10b-5(c) (unlawful
to participate in fraudulent or deceitful transaction in purchase or sale of securities).
142. See 425 U.S. at 214 (language of rule lob-5 requires imposition of scienter standard
of liability).
143. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982) (section heading for § 10 limits application of provision
to regulation of manipulative and deceptive activity only).
144. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980) (listing standards of liability for subsec-
tions of § 17(a) of '33 Act); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199, 214 (1976) (SEC
rulemaking authority under § 10(b) limited to regulation of manipulative or deceptive activity).
145. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 692 (1980) (language of § 17(a)(l) requires imposition
of scienter standard of liability); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200-01 (1976) (words
referring to intentional misconduct in § 10(b) require scienter standard of liability); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(e) (1982) (prohibiting fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative activity in connection with tender
offer).
146. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) (tender offer antifraud provision); supra notes 11-14
and accompanying text (discussion of § 14(e)).
147. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) (Congress did not divide § 14(e) into separate clauses).
148. Id.
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dard of liability.149 The second clause of section 14(e) prohibits manipulative
and deceptive acts or practices in connection with any tender offer. 5 As
previously stated, the language of the second clause of section 14(e) parallels
the language of section 17(a)(1) which the Supreme Court has held to require
a negligence standard of liability. 151 Arguably, if the statutory scheme is fol-
lowed the language of section 14(e) would permit either a negligence standard
under the first clause or a scienter standard under the second clause, depend-
ing on the type of violation. Moreover, section 14(e), unlike section 10(b),
is not limited strictly to a scienter standard of liability by a section heading
confining the scope of section 14(e) to manipulative and deceptive activity. 1
3
Although no courts have applied a negligence standard to section 14(e) based
on the language of the first clause of the provision, a dual standard of liability
under section 14(e) is plausible in light of the Supreme Court's decision to
apply differing standards under the subsections of section 17(a).1 15
Although a dual standard of liability under section 14(e) is only a possi-
bility, a dual standard of liability under section 14(a) is a reality.' 5 According
to the present case law, a dual standard of liability exists under section 14(a)
and SEC rule 14a-9 since federal courts addressing the issue would apply a
scienter standard to corporate outsiders and a negligence standard to corporate
insiders.'56 In addition to the Adams decision, the Fradkin court supported
the imposition of a scienter standard on outside accountants in dicta, and
the Gerstle court stated that the facts of a particular case could sometimes
149. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696 (1980) (language of § 17(a)(2) requires imposition
of negligence standard of liability). Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (1982) (prohibiting use of
"untrue statement" or material omission to obtain money or property in connection with offer
or sale of securities) with id. § 78n(e) (prohibiting use of "untrue statement' or material omis-
sion in connection with tender offer).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
151. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696 (1980) (language of § 17(a)(1) requires imposition
of scienter standard of liability). Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) (1982) (prohibiting employment
of device or scheme to defraud in offer or sale of securities) with id. § 78n(e) (prohibiting use
of fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative activity in connection with tender offer).
152. See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SEcurmas REauIAnoN 590 (1983) (Supreme Court's
implementation of differing standards of liability under § 17(a) should apply to the two clauses
of § 14(e) because of similarities in language).
153. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982) (section heading of § 14 does not limit scope to manipulative
and deceptive activity only); supra note 143 and accompanying text (§ 10(b) limited by section
heading which only allows regulation of manipulative and deceptive acts).
154. See L. Loss, supra note 152, at 590 (dual standard of liability possible under § 14(e));
supra note 16 (federal court decisions applying scienter standard to § 14(e) tender offer violations).
155. See supra note 41 (cases applying a negligence standard of liability to rule 14a-9 viola-
tions); supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text (discussing Adams decision that scienter stan-
dard applied to outside accountants under rule 14a-9); supra notes 147-54 and accompanying
text (discussing possibility of dual standard of liability under § 14(e)).
156. See Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 431 (6th Cir.) (scienter stan-
dard required in rule 14a-9 action against outside accountants), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980);
Fradkin v. Ernst, 571 F. Supp. 829, 843 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (negligence standard required in rule
14a-9 action against corporate insider).
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justify a scienter standard of liability.'1 7 Under section 14(a) and rule 14a-9,
a dual standard of liability depends on different categories of actors, specifically
corporate insiders and outside accountants.' Under section 14(e), a dual stan-
dard of liability, however, would focus on the type of act a defendant
commits. 59 A dual standard of liability under section 14(e), therefore, would
be similar to the dual standard under section 17(a) where a court will apply
either a scienter or negligence standard depending on whether the alleged viola-
tion involves a material misstatement or omission, or a manipulative or
fraudulent act.' 60 Arguably, the Supreme Court's application of a dual stan-
dard of liability under section 17(a) would more strongly support a dual stan-
dard under section 14(e) since the dual standard under section 14(a) is based
on the type of actor while under section 14(e) the standard is based on the
type of action.'"'
Despite the contribution of the Adams decision to a dual standard of lia-
bility under rule 14a-9, the rationale of the Adams court in deciding that out-
side accountants are subject to a scienter standard of liability is suspect. 62
The Sixth Circuit neglgected to consider the language of either section 14(a)
or SEC rule 14a-9 and the relationship of these provisions to other provisions
of the federal securities laws. 6 3 The Adams court, however, examined the
statutory language of section 14(e) and agreed with the Hochfelder court that
words prohibiting knowing misconduct, as found in the legislative history of
section 14(a), require the imposition of a scienter standard of liability.'"6
Curiously, the Sixth Circuit found important the inclusion of words connoting
intentional misconduct in section 14(e), but was unconcerned by the absence
of language prohibiting intentional wrongdoing in section 14(a) and rule
14a-9. 65 Additionally, the Adams court relied excessively upon the congres-
157. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text (discussion of Fradkin); supra notes 53-54
and accompanying text (Gerstle dicta that in some situations rule 14a-9 may support scienter
standard of liability).
158. Compare Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973) (cor-
porate insider subject to negligence standard of liability in rule 14a-9 action) with Adams v. Stan-
dard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 431 (6th Cir.) (outside accountant subject to scienter
standard of liability in rule 14a-9 action), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
159. See supra note 93 (discussion of differing standards of liability under § 17(a)).
160. See supra note 93 (discussion of differing standards of liability applicable to violators
of § 17(a)); supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text (discussion of possibility of dual standard
of liability under § 14(e)).
161. See supra note 93 (discussion of differing standards of liability under § 17(a)); supra
text accompanying notes 155-56 (dual standard of liability under § 14(a) based on kind of actor
while under § 14(e) based on kind of action).
162. See 623 F.2d at 431 (outside accountants subject to scienter standard of liability); supra
notes 66-76 and accompanying text (discussion of Adams).
163. See 623 F.2d at 428-31; Comment, Misleading Proxy Statements-Outside Accountants
Can Be Held Liable Under Rule 14a-9 Only Upon a Showing of Scienter, 56 NoTRE DAME LAW.
579, 584 (1981) (Adams court failed to examine language of rule 14a-9 and relation of rule 14a-9
to other securities provisions) [hereinafter cited as Misleading Proxy].
164. See 623 F.2d at 431; supra notes 88-99 and accompanying text (discussion of Hochfelder).
165. See Misleading Proxy, supra note 163, at 584 (Adams court unconcerned with absence
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sional history of section 14(a) in deciding that outside accountants should be
subject to a scienter standard of liability.16 Finally, the Sixth Circuit expressed
concern for the potential over-liability of accountants under a negligence stan-
dard for minor mistakes.1 67 A concern for the liability of accountants, however,
should not take precedence over the primary goal of protecting shareholders
from the effects of faulty financial statements in the context of a rule 14a-9
action.'
68
A thorough examination of section 14(e) under the Hochfelder formula
for determining the proper standard of liability illustrates that federal courts
are correct in assigning a scienter standard of liability to section 14(e) tender
offer violations.' 69 The actual statutory language and legislative history of sec-
tion 14(e), in conjunction with the fact that a scienter standard under section
14(e) conforms to the federal securities regulatory scheme, reinforces the im-
of language prohibiting intentional misconduct in rule 14a-9).
166. See 623 F.2d at 429-30 (numerous citations by Adams court to congressional history);
Misleading Proxy, supra note 163, at 584-85 (Adams court relied heavily upon legislative history
in determining standard of liability for outside accountants); Comment, Liability of Accountants
for Proxy Violations-The Appropriate Standard of Culpability, 56 WASH. L. REv. 743, 756
(1981) (legislative history of § 14(a) cited in Adams not persuasive because of conflicting statutory
language of § 14(a)).
167. See 623 F.2d at 428. The Sixth Circuit in Adams noted that tender offers and proxy
solicitations are alternative means of achieving corporate control and both are subject to similar
abuses. Id. at 430. The Adams court stated that in passing the Williams Act, Congress intended
proxy statements and tender offers to be subject to the same standards of liability. Id. Because
§ 14(e) requires a scienter standard of liability, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that § 14(a) violators
should be subject to the same standard. Id. The Adams court regulatory scheme analysis, however,
is not persuasive because the court failed to examine the important consideration of whether
the two provisions contain similar statutory language. See id. at 430-31 (Adams court failed to
examine statutory language of § 14(a) and § 14(e)).
168. See Misleading Proxy, supra note 163, at 586 (concern for accountants cannot outweigh
protection of shareholders' interests). Despite the faults contained in the reasoning of the Adams
decision, the Sixth Circuit impliedly raised an important consideration in the context of determin-
ing the standard of liability under rule 14a-9. See 623 F.2d at 428-29. The Adams court noted
that in addition to containing a negligence standard of liability, § 11 of the '33 Act requires
proof of actual investor reliance to convict. Id. The Sixth Circuit also stated that rule lOb-5,
which requires proof of scienter, substitutes a less burdensome standard of materiality for reliance.
Id. at 429; see Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972) (materiality
and not investor reliance must be proven in rule lob-5 case). The Supreme Court, however, has
held that the less exacting standard of materiality, and not actual reliance, applies to rule 14a-9
actions. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1970). An action under rule
14a-9, therefore, only requires a showing of materiality and negligence. See id. at 384-85 (proof
of materiality necessary in rule 14a-9 action); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281,
1299 (2d Cir. 1973) (negligence standard of liability required under rule 14a-9). Since rule 14a-9
only requires a negligence standard of liability and a showing of materiality instead of reliance,
rule 14a-9 is arguably the easiest rule of the federal securities regulation scheme under which
a shareholder may bring suit. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1970)
(proof only of materiality necessary in rule 14a-9 suit); Gerstle v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., 478
F.2d 1281, 1301 (2d Cir. 1973) (negligence standard of liability required in rule 14a-9 suit).




position of a scienter standard of liability by the federal courts.'70 Although
the standard of liability under section 14(e) appears settled, the language of
section 17(a)(2) may allow a future court to impose a negligence standard of
liability on tender offer antifraud violators thereby creating a dual standard
of liability under section 14(e).' 7 ' Under section 14(a), however, the statutory
language of the proxy statement antifraud provision and the general securities
regulatory scheme imply that negligence is the proper standard although the
legislative history.of section 14(a) implies that a scienter standard is the proper
standard of liability.'72 The present applicable case law under section 14(a)
and SEC rule 14a-9 illustrates that a dual standard of liability, determined
by whether the defendant is a corporate insider or outsider, exists under the
proxy statement antifraud provisions.' Although a dual standard of liability
under section 14(a) and rule 14a-9 may create confusion and interpretive dif-
ficulties, a dual standard is not incompatible with the federal securities
regulatory scheme since the Supreme Court has already approved a standard
of liability under section 17(a) of the '33 Act. 174 A Supreme Court decision
similar to Hochfelder would be necessary to avoid the continuance of a stan-
dard of liability under section 14(a) and rule 14a-9. 7 1
JEFFREY J. GIGUERE
170. See supra notes 127-45 and accompanying text (examining statutory language of § 14(e)
and legislative history of § 14(e), and position of § 14(e) in federal securities regulation scheme);
supra note 16 and accompanying text (listing decisions holding that scienter is proper standard
of liability under § 14(e)).
171. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text (noting possibility of dual standard of
liability under § 14(e)).
172. See supra notes 100-26 and accompanying text (applying § 14(a) and rule 14a-9 to three
part Hochfelder analysis).
173. See supra notes 42-65, 77-87 and accompanying text (discussion of Gerstle, Gould, and
Fradkin court holdings that negligence is proper standard of liability under rule 14a-9); supra
notes 66-76 and accompanying text (discussion of Adams court holding that scienter is proper
standard of liability under rule 14a-9); supra note 158 and accompanying text (determination
of proper standard of liability under rule 14a-9 depends on whether the defendant is a corporate
insider or outsider).
174. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980) (dual standard of liability approved by
Supreme Court under § 17(a) of '33 Act).
175. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201-15 (1976) (fixing scienter as proper
standard of liability under rule 10b-5).
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